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Introduction
This paper examines whether foreign banks contributed to financial stability in emerging market economies (EMEs) and developing countries (DCs) in the global financial crisis by mitigating the sudden stop of capital flows and the contraction of credit growth after the Lehman collapse. It is motivated by the fact that after the EME crises of the 1990s the entry of foreign banks was seen as a key measure to strengthen the resilience of EME and DC banking sectors against external shocks. Authorities in many EMEs and DCs followed this policy recommendation. As a result, the average share of banking sector assets held by foreign banks in EMEs and DCs rose from 21 percent in 1995 to 38 percent in 2005.
In this environment of globalised banking, cross-border capital flows from mature economies to EMEs and DCs recovered from the crises-lows of the late 1990s. Aggregate outstanding claims of BIS-reporting banks vis-à-vis EMEs and DCs almost tripled between 2000 and the third quarter of 2008. Moreover -as in previous episodes of strong capital inflows -growth of real private sector credit was advancing rapidly. The trend of increasing financial integration and deepening ended abruptly after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Cross-border bank flows stopped or even reversed and real credit growth slowed substantially in most countries. However, the degree of the downturn varied across countries and regions. While some countries experienced a classical sudden stop of capital flows and a strong credit contraction, the decline was more subdued in other countries.
We analyze the role of foreign banks in stabilizing cross-border bank flows and credit growth in EMEs and DCs after the Lehman collapse, controlling for the size of the pre-crisis boom and other determinants of financial instability. Based on a sample of 97 EMEs and DCs and estimating a cross-sectional OLS model we find that their stabilizing impact was limited to the crossborder component of financial globalization. EME and DC banking sectors with a higher share of foreign ownership in total banking assets experienced a smaller decline in capital flows. One percentage point more of foreign bank asset share leads to a decrease of more than two percent in the magnitude of fall of cross-border bank flows. However, foreign banks did not significantly dampen the decline in credit growth in their respective host countries. These results are robust to variations of the instability and boom measures.
A closer analysis shows that the stabilizing impact of foreign banks was a regional rather than a global phenomenon. Foreign banks mitigated the fall in cross-border bank flows to Eastern Europe and Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, only in Sub-Saharan Africa did foreign banks contribute to a more stable growth of credit in the crisis period. We interpret our results as indicating that foreign banks are no panacea for guaranteeing financial stability in EMEs and DCs in an environment of increasing financial globalization. In particular, hopes that a stronger presence of foreign banks might help host countries in isolating domestic credit from international shocks did not materialize in the current crisis.
The paper is organized as follows: after a short review of the literature and the empirical evidence on foreign banks and financial stability issues in EMEs and DCs (section 2), we illustrate developments in cross-border bank flows and real domestic credit growth during the financial crisis (section 3). Section 4 describes our data and the model specification. Sections 5 and 6 present the results and robustness checks and section 7 concludes.
Foreign Banks and Financial Stability: Literature Review and Empirical Evidence
Boom-bust cycles in capital flows and domestic credit characterized financial liberalization in emerging markets and developing countries in the 1990s, (Tornell and Westermann 2002, Mendoza and Terrones 2008) . From a financial stability perspective, the evidence suggests two possible policy responses. The first response is to pursue a cautious approach toward capital account liberalization (Rodrik and Subramanian 2009, Ostry et al. 2010 ). Capital controls and regulatory measures limit capital inflows, in particular highly reversible flows, like cross-border bank lending (Becker et al. 2007 ). Thus, domestic credit growth and the associated financial stability risks remain contained. The second response is to strengthen domestic banking sectors in EMEs and DCs, as buoyant capital flows bring about unsustainable credit booms in an environment characterized by poor governance of domestic banks and a weak supervisory and regulatory framework (Krugman 1998 , Llewellyn 2002 , Hernández and Landerretche 2002 . Thus, EMEs and DCs should not retreat on financial opening but improve the domestic financial systems. Inviting foreign banks to enter domestic banking sectors is a major element of a strategy to achieve this goal (Mishkin 2001 ).
Foreign institutions are expected to strengthen financial stability in EMEs and DCs by improving the solvency and liquidity of host country banking systems. Banking sector solvency improves because foreign banks are better capitalized than their domestic peers. Moreover, they provide 'reputational capital' (Hellman and Murdock 1998) . Indeed, SSA countries -on average -take a rather restrictive stance on financial integration. The same applies to Emerging Asia and most countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA). In the latter regions, the generally sceptical attitude toward financial liberalization influenced policies on the entry of foreign banks, as many countries did not open up their banking systems to foreign institutions. As a result, there is no country with a high penetration of foreign banks in these regions ( Figure 1 ).
Figure 1: Foreign bank asset share across regions (in 2005)
The line in the box indicates the median, the bottom and the top of the box are the 25th and the 75th percentiles and the ends of the whiskers mark the 5th and 95th percentiles. Dots represent outliers.
Source: Claessens et al. 2008, own calculations
The years before 2008 were characterized by a substantial decline in the number and severity of EME and DC banking crises compared to the 1990s (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009 We contribute to this literature by directly testing the validity of the policy proposition that a higher share of foreign ownership of EME and DC banking sector assets stabilizes cross-border capital flows and domestic credit in times of financial distress. As the Lehman event marks a clear-cut beginning of the crisis, we measure instability by the magnitude of the post-Lehman declines in cross-border bank flows and credit growth rates against the levels and growth rates seen before the crisis. This is because it is not the post-crisis level of flows or lending per se which constitutes a sudden stop or credit contraction forcing the real economy to adjust, but the change in flows and credit growth. A decline in cross-border bank flows from pre-crisis heights to a much lower but still positive level can be a severe financial shock for a country. Moreover, given the substantial regional differences in foreign ownership among EMEs and DCs we conduct a regional analysis in order to find out whether the contribution of foreign banks to financial stability has been different across regions. Closer analysis reveals that there were substantial regional differences in the boom and bust periods (Figure 3 ). In the period preceding the Lehman collapse capital inflows were most pronounced in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, followed by Asia and Latin America. However, there were again substantial cross-regional differences ( Figure 5 ). In Eastern Europe credit growth slowed at the end of 2007/early 2008 but remained on elevated levels, while average credit growth in LAC turned negative in 2009Q1 and remained relatively stable in Asia. By contrast, credit growth slowed down markedly and turned negative in Eastern Europe and Latin America after the Lehman shock, while credit growth proved largely resilient in Asia and SubSaharan Africa. 
Data and Model Specification
We analyze whether foreign bank presence had a stabilizing impact on cross-border bank flows and real credit growth in the recent crisis. Cross-border bank flows are from the BIS International Locational Banking statistics and are the exchange-rate-adjusted changes from the quarterly reports of outstanding claims of all BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis non-residents and vis-à-vis residents in foreign currency. Currently banking institutions in 42 countries are reporting to the BIS Locational statistics. As these countries include all major economies and the largest centers of financial activity the coverage of international banking activity is virtually complete (Wooldridge 2002) .
We obtain data on domestic private sector credit from the IMFs International Financial Statistics (IFS line 22d). We deflate it using the CPI series (IFS line 64). As data availability is limited we supplement the IFS CPI data with data from national sources for China, Ukraine, Hungary and Bosnia and Herzegovina
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. We seasonally adjust these series and calculate month-on-month growth rates for real private sector credit growth. We use growth rates for real credit as there is no data for exchange rate adjusted changes in the outstanding stock of domestic credit as is the case for cross-border bank flows provided by the BIS. We have collected data for 97 EMEs and DCs. Due to the limited availability of data for some indicators the number of observations in our estimations is often smaller.
We construct variables to measure the magnitude of instability in bank flows and credit growth during the crisis. These variables we call FALL as they depict the sudden drop from the (in most cases) higher pre-Lehman level to the post-Lehman level.
- A higher FALL value indicates greater financial instability in the respective country.
The explanatory variable of our main interest is the asset share of foreign banks in total banking sector assets in the respective host countries (FBAS). We use the dataset by Claessens et al (2008) , where foreign banks are defined as banks with direct foreign ownership of more than 50 percent of capital. We expect foreign bank presence to have a mitigating impact on our FALL variables (i.e. negative coefficients).
The boom-bust literature suggests that the pre-crisis boom is a major determinant of the fall. For example Sula (2006) shows that surges in capital inflows significantly increases the probability of sudden stops. Thus, we construct measures for the SURGE in cross-border bank flows and real credit growth prior to the shock as additional explanatory variables:
-SURGE flows is the log of the aggregated quarterly cross-border bank flows over the three years prior to the Lehman bankruptcy (i.e. 2005Q3-2008Q2).
-SURGE credit is the average month-on-month real credit growth rate in the three years prior to the crisis (July 2005-June 2008). To increase the coefficient estimates we again multiply by 100.
We expect the SURGEs to aggravate the FALLs, i.e. positive coefficient estimates. For testing the robustness of our results we will vary the FALL and SURGE measures. We estimate the following cross-sectional OLS model applying heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and using Stata:
Note that FALL and SURGE are both, either the fall and surge in bank flows or the fall and surge in real credit growth in country i. FBAS is the foreign bank asset share in total banking assets in country i. X is a matrix of the following structural and macroeconomic variables as well as external and internal vulnerability indicators:
Structural and macroeconomic variables:
-Institutional quality (Kaufmann et al. 2009 ). Better creditor protection and information sharing among institutions like public credit registries provide comfort to foreign and domestic investors (Papaioannou 2009 -Export partners' GDP growth in 2009 (IMF DOTS). Real GDP growth of the 30 main export partners in 2009 weighted by their share in total exports of a given EME/DC in 2008. Following Aisen and Franken (2010) we construct this variable to account for economic activity after the crisis avoiding endogeneity problems. We expect a negative coefficient as higher GDP growth in the main trading partners indicates higher demand for that country's exports and hence stronger domestic economic activity. This should positively influence bank flows and credit growth.
-Current account to GDP in 2007 (IMF WEO). The current account balance provides information about countries' positions as net providers or recipients of external finance. Countries with a positive (less negative balance) are less prone to capital flow reversals as they do not depend on external finance in net terms. Thus, a higher current account surplus should be associated with a smaller FALL, i.e. we expect a negative coefficient.
-Percentage change in money market rate (IFS line 60b) Growth in real private sector credit is influenced by domestic monetary policy reflected in interest rates prevailing on money markets (Aisen and Franken 2010). Thus, the percentage change in the money market rate between Sept. 2008 and March 2009 serves as a proxy for the ability and willingness of central banks to foster credit expansion after Lehman. We expect that a larger decline in the money market rate dampens the magnitude of FALLcredit (positive coefficient expected). We refrain from using the change in money market rate as an independent variable in the estimation of FALL flows as -with open capital accounts -it is a variable influenced by changes in cross-border flows and the exchange rate regime.
External and internal vulnerabilities:
-External debt to GNI (WDI). Net debtor countries face a higher risk of sudden stops and thus a decline in capital flows and domestic credit as the indebtedness of a country depicts vulnerability regarding the risk of default (positive coefficient expected).
-Exchange rate regime. A floating exchange rate provides a certain buffer against external shocks. Thus, we expect the sign of the coefficient to be negative as -making use of the IMF exchange rate classification with a scale from one to eight -a higher value indicates a more flexible exchange rate (Appendix 3).
-International reserves to total external debt in 2007 (WDI). A higher ratio indicates that the country is in a better position to deal with liquidity shocks, comforting both foreign investors as well as domestic financial institutions. Thus, a higher ratio should stabilize capital inflows as well as credit growth (negative coefficient expected)
-Foreign liability dollarization (Lane and Shambaugh 2010) . A higher share of external liabilities denominated in foreign currency ('original sin') in total external liabilities indicates a higher exposure to exchange rate risk, making countries more vulnerable to sudden stops and the corresponding decline in credit growth (positive coefficient expected).
-Credit deposit ratio in 2007 (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 2009). Banking sectors with a higher credit to deposit ratio rely on other funding sources, including foreign funding, to finance credit expansion. Given this dependency on foreign funds, in a crisis situation, foreign investors are inclined to withdraw from these countries as early as possible, forcing banks to adjust private sector credit respectively, suggesting a positive coefficient. However, the opposite reasoning might apply with regard to capital flows for countries with a strong foreign bank presence (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2010). Parent banks might initially withdraw funds from countries with a low credit deposit ratio because headquarters want to make use of the excess liquidity held by their subsidiaries abroad. This argument suggests a negative coefficient.
Further we use a set of dummy variables to account for effects of the different groups of countries regarding region, income and other characteristics. 
Basic Model
We find the expected mitigating impact of foreign bank presence on FALL as all coefficient estimates of FBAS show the expected negative sign (Table 1) . However, only for FALL flows , the fall in cross-border bank flows, is the impact of foreign banks significant (columns 1-3). Each additional percentage point in foreign bank asset share leads to a decrease in FALL flows of roughly two percent. Turning to FALL credit , the fall in real credit growth, we find a mitigating but not significant impact of foreign bank presence (columns 4-6). Further we find strong evidence for the expected boom-bust relationship for bank flows and credit growth. SURGE flows has a significant positive non-linear impact on FALL flows (column 3). The more it varies upward or downward from the turning point (i.e. 1.4) the more aggravating is its marginal impact on FALL flows . A closer look at the countries experiencing lower aggregate inflows or even outflows suggests that this might be due to other destabilizing factors like institutional underdevelopment and political risk. Those factors might have become more important in an environment of increasing global financial stress and risk aversion. Overall, the higher the absolute SURGE in flows prior to the crisis (no matter if inflows or outflows) the more destabilizing was its impact after the financial shock.
The pre-crisis credit boom is an important determinant of the magnitude of the credit contraction. We find a positive and significant linear relationship (column 5). The higher the pre-shock credit boom, the higher the FALL after the Lehman collapse.
The basic models containing foreign bank presence and the booms prior to the Lehman shock as explanatory variables explain about 60 percent of the variation in FALL flows and 25 percent of the variation in FALL credit .
Capital inflows and credit growth are closely linked. General economic developments or situations in a country might simultaneously affect the shock in bank inflows and in real credit growth. Therefore it might be that the equation errors correlate. To control for this we further test the relationship with a seemingly unrelated regression system proposed by Zellner in 1962 (Table 2) . The SUR-estimation results confirm our previous ones. While a higher foreign bank presence stabilizes bank inflows during the crisis this is not translated into more stable real credit growth.
Further the pre-crisis surges remain important determinants in both equations.
Instability in bank flows and credit growth might be influenced by many variables. To test whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion of other variables in the regression we add the variables referred to in section 4. Due to data availability (Appendix 4) and correlation among independent variables (Appendix 5) we first determine financial openness and economic activity growth as main further determinants on the FALLs. Then we add each of the other one by one before mentioned variables to control for their effects.
We find that financial openness and the change in institutional quality significantly affect the instability in bank flows (Appendix 6). As expected higher financial openness and a recent deterioration in institutional quality aggravate the FALL. We explain the significant effect of recent changes in institutional quality with the increasing risk awareness after the Lehman collapse. The coefficient estimate of the reserves to debt ratio is significant as well (column 7), indicating that better reserve adequacy stabilized bank flows. However, a closer look at the data reveals that this result is driven by some outlier values. Botswana, China, Nigeria and Algeria have reserve to debt ratios higher than 400 (while the median of all countries is 53, the mean 123). If we exclude them from the sample the coefficient estimate loses significance.
For FALL credit only foreign liability dollarization has a significant and positive effect, indicating that a higher liability dollarization aggravates the instability of credit growth (Appendix 7). Moreover, only when adding FLD to the basic model does the coefficient estimate of FBAS become significant, indicating a mitigating impact of foreign bank presence (column 9). This suggests that foreign banks stabilize credit growth in countries which are less subject to the 'origi- 
Regional Differentiation
The illustration of bank flows and credit growth before and during the financial crisis revealed substantial regional differences (Section 3). The same applies to the presence of foreign banks in the respective EME and DC regions which is heterogeneous regarding dispersion and penetration of foreign bank presence per region (Figure 1 ). These regional differences might affect the mitigating impact of foreign banks on the stability of bank flows and credit growth. We test for regional differences by interacting region-dummies with our variable for foreign bank presence. The results indicate that the effect of foreign bank presence on FALL in bank flows and real credit growth differs considerably among regions.
Regarding the FALL in bank flows we find only in ECA and SSA a negative and significant marginal effect of foreign bank presence (Table 3) . Within the other regions foreign bank presence even had a slightly destabilizing albeit not significant impact.
In Sub-Saharan Africa the stabilizing impact of foreign banks on bank flows was translated into more stable credit growth during the financial crisis. However in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, banking sectors do not seem to transmit their relatively stable external funding position to a smooth pattern of domestic real credit growth. With exception of SSA, foreign banks do not have a significant impact on stability in credit growth.
The stabilizing impact of foreign banks is highest in those regions with the highest average foreign bank presence. Moreover, the impact of foreign banks on domestic credit growth might only emerge when foreign banks are dominating players in host country banking systems. This might suggest that the influence of foreign banks is due to a certain level of foreign bank presence rather than to other, region-specific factors of influence. We test this proposition by grouping our sample countries according to their foreign bank asset share. Countries with up to 33 percent foreign bank asset share belong to group T1, those in T2 have more than 33 and up to 66 percent foreign bank asset share, while countries with more than 66 percent foreign bank asset share belong to T3. Each group dummy we interact with FBAS. The results show insignificant coefficient estimates for each interaction term (Table 4) for both FALL measures. As the number of countries per group is diverse we further test for a conditional impact of foreign bank presence with only two groups and, moreover, with a squared FBAS variable instead of grouping. Coefficient estimates of the interaction and of the squared term do not show significance as well.
Overall our results indicate that the mitigating impact of foreign bank presence is a regional rather than a global phenomenon. Our conjecture is that it is either the regional characteristics of ECA and SSA or of countries with substantial financial engagements in both regions which sta- Sub-Saharan Africa possesses the characteristic that foreign bank presence has a long history which is not linked to the process of financial globalization. Indeed, on average, Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the closest capital account according to the Chinn-Ito Index (Appendix 4). Thus, foreign banks significantly stabilized cross-border capital flows in a region where capital flows are restricted the most. Hence, for the global financial crisis it is difficult to base an argument that foreign banks enhance stability in financially open EMEs and DCs by referring to the case of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Robustness Checks
To check for the robustness of our results we conduct some sensitivity tests. We vary those two of our variables that are not predetermined, i.e. FALL and SURGE. The tests reveal that the specification of FALL is of more relevance for the robustness of our results than the specification of the SURGE variable. Generally our findings are robust as the coefficients remain significant for the different specifications. As a result the newly defined FALL variable is smaller than the original variable for those countries. When we exclude the MENA countries from the estimation the FBAS coefficient turns out to be significant again with the same strength as in our main estimation. As a second variation of our main FALL variable we extend the period after the Lehman shock to nine months (columns 3 and 4), including 2009Q2 when average regional outflows were already on a declining trend or even turned into inflows. Further we extend the pre-crisis period to two years, i.e. 2006Q3-2008Q2 (columns 5 and 6). The results confirm our general findings. Foreign bank presence has a stabilizing impact which is significant only regarding cross-border flows.
We change the SURGE variable by altering the time periods covered and by changing the method of calculation of SURGE. We define SURGE periods for three additional time windows prior to the Lehman collapse. The estimations confirm our previous results (Appendix 9). The impact of the SURGE remains aggravating and highly significant in all estimations. As before, the stabilizing effect of foreign bank presence is significant regarding bank flows (columns 1-3) but not regarding credit growth (columns 4-6).
Finally, we change the calculation method of SURGE. Instead of using absolute values of crossborder flows and credit growth, we use an alternative SURGE variable that is based on deviations of pre-shock developments from the mean: In addition to the deviation of the three year pre-shock average from the pre-shock period mean (columns 7 and 9), we also run an estimation with the deviation of the three year pre-shock average from the whole period mean covering 2002 to mid-2009 (columns 8 and 10). Again these tests are in line with our previous results.
Conclusions
After the financial and currency crises of the 1990s many EMEs and DCs, in particular in Eastern Europe and Latin America, opened up their banking sectors for foreign-owned banks. This paper analyzes the role of foreign banks for financial stability in EMEs and DCs after the collapse of Lehman Brothers by looking at their impact on mitigating the fall in cross-border bank flows and domestic credit growth in the immediate post-Lehman period compared to pre-crisis levels.
We find robust evidence indicating that countries with a high share of banking sector assets held by foreign banks experienced a more stable pattern of cross-border bank flows during the recent crisis than countries with a low share of banking sector assets held by foreign institutions. Moreover, the mitigating impact of foreign banks is of quantitative relevance. One percentage point more of foreign bank asset share leads to a decrease of more than two percent in the magnitude of fall of cross-border bank flows. A regional analysis suggests that this result mainly reflects the impact of foreign banks in Eastern Europe and Central Asia as well as Sub-Saharan Africa. This may be due to special features of both regions. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia -in particular in countries that have already joined the European Union or are deemed to become Member States in the future -foreign banks have been entering host country banking markets because of the European integration process. Thus, parent banks perceive host markets as an extension of their home market and consider the presence of their subsidiaries as a longterm investment. Moreover, parent banks received strong support from home country central banks and governments as well as international financial institutions in the post-crisis period. This may explain why in Eastern Europe cross-border flows have been less prone to a sudden stop than in other regions. Sub-Saharan Africa is special as many countries of the region are characterized by a long-standing presence of foreign banks operating in an environment of a rather closed capital account. Thus, foreign banks contributed to financial stability in host countries which have only marginally integrated into the global financial system. Accordingly, the evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa neither supports nor rejects the argument that a high degree of foreign ownership serves as a key instrument allowing EMEs and DCs to open up financially without running severe stability risks.
Overall we do not find evidence indicating that foreign banks contributed to a smoother pattern of domestic post-crisis credit growth. The regional analysis reveals that only in Sub-Saharan Africa countries with a higher share of total banking sector did assets held by foreign banks experience a smaller credit contraction in the post-Lehman period.
We interpret our results as indicating that foreign banks are no panacea for guaranteeing financial stability in EMEs and DCs in an environment of increasing financial globalization. While a strong foreign bank presence has mitigated the sudden stop of cross-border lending to Eastern Europe and Central Asia, it has not contributed to a less severe domestic credit contraction. Moreover, the positive impact on financial stability with regard to cross-border bank flows seems to have more to do with the peculiar European environment than with foreign bank ownership as such. Thus, the evidence suggests that EMEs and DCs aiming to avoid traditional boom-bust cycles in domestic credit growth may be better off preventing the boom in the first place and/or conducting macroeconomic and regulatory policies, including regulatory policies with regard to the capital account, that put them in a position to act decisively when they are hit ASIA (13) ECA (23) LAC (21) MENA (9) SSA (31) 
